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BIG ROADS, BIG RIGHTS: VARIETIES OF
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND THEIR
IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
Carol M. Rose*
Two types of public infrastructure-roads and property rights-are often thought
critical to economic development; this Article compares their impacts on the
natural environment. Both roads and property rights draw unfamiliar persons to
remote areas, undermine existing informal resource practices, and enhance wide
commercial trade, creating wealth but also reducing local resource diversity. New
kinds of property rights hold much promise for environmental protection, but
unlike roads and conventional property rights, environmental property rights
would be tasked with curtailing commerce, as in roadless areas and caps on
resource use. This sharp divergence from the traditional commercial mission of
public infrastructure can limit support for environmental property rights, creating
an opening for fuzzier and more consultative versions of environmental property.
INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship of property rights regimes to environmental
goods? If one takes seriously the idea that property entails at least some ability to
exclude, then environmental resources would seem to be those most likely to
escape property regimes altogether. Who could exclude another from using the air,
taking wild animals, sailing on the ocean? Those environmental resources that
seem most pristine are often those most remote from property, at the depths of the
sea or the heights of the mountains or the heart of the forest. To be sure, there have
been private property regimes governing some aspects of these activities-English
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aristocrats' wildlife ownership, for example.' But the very resistance of
environmental goods to "propertization" is one reason for their undoing. Since all
too often, no one controls depredations on environmental resources, and since no
one in particular can claim the benefits of investment in these resources, they are
particularly subject to overuse and underinvestment, sometimes to the point of
irrevocable collapse, as with the now-extinct passenger pigeon or old-growth
forests of Europe and eastern North America.
With the advent of modern environmental law, the modem regulatory
state has adopted the role of owner of environmental goods, determining their total
allowable use through detailed regulation. But in the last two decades, regulatory
thinking has increasingly turned to systems of private property rights in order to
remedy environmental depredations. Among these are conservation easements for
land and instream rights for water, but the greatest excitement has been reserved
for the so-called cap-and-trade programs. The best known example is the United
States' Acid Rain program, which capped the total sulfur dioxide ("SO2") loading
in the atmosphere and divided the allowable total into individual allowances that
can trade in markets.2 Tradeable rights regimes have also been successful with
certain fish species in Australia and New Zealand,3 but much of today's talk about
cap-and-trade revolves around climate change. 4 Cap-and-trade systems, it is hoped,
can help to prevent further loading of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,
without breaking the back of industrial development.5
Cap-and-trade thus entails one of the newest steps in the development of
what I will call the "public infrastructure of property." Property rights regimes at a
minimum require some system to define rights, to signal their presence, to monitor
transgressions, to resolve disputes about who has what rights, and to enforce the
rights held valid. Ancient communal irrigation systems, modem landed property,
intellectual property, and now cap-and-trade allowances-all these varied property
regimes share these minimal requirements. In this paper, however, I am
particularly interested in what I call formal or "modernist" property rights-those
that include the added elements of publicness in information and enforcement as
well as alienability to any potential buyers, be they insiders or strangers in any
1. Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife
Institutions, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 625, 630-34 (1995).
2. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-765 lo (2000).
3. Robert T. Deacon et al., Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to
Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 479,
484 (2008), and sources cited therein; Carrie A. Tipton, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest:
Developing a National System of Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean
Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 400-02 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Patricia Ware, International Coalition Formed in Lisbon to
Establish Cap-and-Trade Carbon Market, 30 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 874 (2007) (describing
plans of several U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and European countries to lower
greenhouse gases through carbon trading market).
5. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal
Climate Change Proposal is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 123, 137 (2008) (describing
current climate change proposals and prevalence of cap-and-trade as method).
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given community. These are the kinds of property rights that modem property
theorists as well as traditionalists refer to as "in rem"--good against "the world."6
This Article views modernist property rights through what might seem a
peculiar lens: it compares the environmental implications of modernist property
rights to those of another kind of public infrastructure, namely roads. The
environmental impacts of roads and property rights, of course, are not necessarily
or even predominantly independent phenomena. Indeed, roads and modernist
rights tend to occur in sequence. As roads open up previously undisturbed
ecological resources to new kinds of commercial development, they bring new
entrants who exploit those resources or convert them to new uses.7 The arrival of
new players, however, may overwhelm any preexisting property regimes, leaving
seemingly "free" resources open to a kind of free-for-all, along with attendant
social conflict, dissipation of rents, relentless searches for the quick buck, and, of
course, environmental degradation.8 But at a somewhat later stage, new settlers
may also come to demand the very kinds of modernist property rights-formal
rights in land, commodities, and financial instruments, for example-that dampen
down conflicts, encourage long-term investment, and enhance far-flung
commerce.
9
In the gap between roads and rights, environmental destruction is easily
understood under the rubric of the well-known "tragedy of the commons. '"1 Much
of this Article, however, focuses on the more stable and generally somewhat later
scenario, if and when secure and well-understood property rights succeed in
containing social conflict and encouraging wealth-creating investment and trade.
There are unquestionably environmentally beneficial effects of this evolution in
property rights. The argument of this Article, however, is that modernist property
regimes, too, are very likely to have some distinctive and adverse impacts on
environmental resources, creating a second gap, this time between the
establishment of property rights and the establishment of environmental protection.
The most notable aspect of this gap is the shrinking of ecological diversity-a
feature that "big rights" share with "big roads." Both these forms of public
infrastructure encourage wide-ranging commerce, and their very bigness
undermines the finer grains of local diversity.
6. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776-77, 789 (2001) (distinguishing contract from property rights
in that the latter are good against "the world").
7. See, e.g., Phillip M. Fearnside, Avanca Brasil: Environmental and Social
Consequences of Brazil's Planned Infrastructure in Amazonia, 30 ENVTL. MGMT. 735, 737
(2002) (describing usual path of roads followed by deforestation).
8. See LEE J. ALSTON, GARY D. LIBECAP & BERNARDO MUELLER, TITLES,
CONFLICT AND LAND USE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND REFORM ON
THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON FRONTIER 15 (1999) (noting that arrival of new entrants on frontier
may lead to breakdown of earlier resource regimes).
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. This phrase was coined by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (arguing that resources open to use by all deteriorate from
overuse and underinvestment).
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If these forms of public infrastructure-roads and modernist property
rights-foster commerce while diminishing environmental diversity, they
nevertheless put some important items in the plus column for conservation.
Commerce and trade tend to make societies wealthier, and economists argue that
over time, wealthier societies tend to put a higher percentage of the national wealth
into environmental protection." Moreover, standard economic analysis would
suggest that, perhaps ironically, roads and rights, by increasing commercial
activities, also increase the value of ecological diversity simply by making
diversity scarcer.' 2 In that sense, roads and rights help to establish the
preconditions for heightened environmental protection.
How, then, might an emergent higher valuation on environmental goods
be satisfied in a society that has newly disposable wealth to satisfy that value? One
type of answer is essentially reactionary: blow up the roads and ban property and
commerce. This move undoubtedly has some appeal to environmental fringe
groups, 13 but even if efforts of this sort were to succeed, their resort to violence
would cast doubt on any claim to moral superiority. Another option is intense
"command and control" regulation, which has had substantial success in some
areas; but the expense and rigidity of this kind of regulation has put it out of favor,
at least for the moment. 14 Moreover, the ascendance of global issues like climate
change has made command-and-control seem irrelevant, at least on a worldwide
basis, where there is no political basis for a uniform and intense regulatory
structure.
Perhaps it is for those reasons that much of the discussion about
environmental protection has turned to modernist property rights-that is to say, to
increasing reliance on one of the very types of public infrastructures that have
created the need for environmentally protective measures in the first place. As one
moves from roads to modernist property rights, however, and then further still to
the more specialized environmental property rights, one frequently finds some
11. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, 15 J.
ECON PERSP. 113, 115, 119 (2001) (describing "Kuznets curve" of worsening followed by
improving environmental protection over course of development); cf Douglas A. Kysar,
Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The
Skeptical Environmentalistfor Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 249-
52 (2003) (accepting but criticizing major aspects of thesis that greater wealth leads to
greater environmental protection).
12. Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and Delay in the- Assignment of
Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 379, 384 (2007) (noting that resources may grow more
valuable due to depletion).
13. For a description of "ecoterrorism" (also distinguishing ecoterrorism from
other forms of terrorism), see Chrystal Mancuso Smith, Comment, From Monkeywrenching
to Mass Destruction: Eco-Sabotage and the American West, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENvTL. L. 319, 322-25 (2006)
14. See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What
Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 273, 279-82 (2005) (describing
successes but noting emerging criticisms of command-and-control or "behavior-based"
environmental regulation); cf Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based
Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83 (2000) (defending technology-based command-and-
control environmental regulation).
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striking similarities but also some distinct social and institutional differences.
Roads, modernist property regimes, and environmental property regimes all have
public-good characteristics, in the sense that under normal circumstances, no
private actors can fully capture the gains from their establishment and
maintenance. 15 Public goods are always difficult to establish and manage, but they
become increasingly problematic as one moves from roads to conventional
modernist property rights and then to environmental property rights. Roads require
a substantial effort, but they also have powerful supporters and constituencies.
16
Modernist individual property rights systems have important constituencies, too,
but they face more competition from those who favor preexisting or other informal
rights regimes, and, in addition, they entail an ongoing governmental commitment
to recordkeeping and enforcement rather than a relatively simple construction
project followed by occasional repair. When one comes to environmental property
rights systems, rights definition and enforcement take on even more complexity;
one finds supporters for these efforts as well, but that support is relatively
fragmented and unsteady-and beset by practical difficulties as well as skeptics
and objectors. 7
One problem for environmental property rights, then, is that the
sequencing of public goods provision is very likely to put them late in the game,
long after roads and somewhat after conventional property rights as well, and by
that time considerable environmental damage may have already occurred. But
there is another source of difficulty, too: environmental property self-consciously
reverses the traditional commercial course of public infrastructure both of roads
and of conventional property rights. Today's environmental laws consciously
block off some environmental resources, turning them literally into roadless areas,
precisely to halt the impacts that roads have on delicate resources and the people
who depend on them.' 8 This feature, however, runs contrary to the traditional
mission of roadbuilders and land sale offices, and it certainly generates conflicts
15. See, e.g., Jay B. Keshan & Rajiv C. Shaw, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALE J.
LAW & TECH. 277, 378-80 (2004) (listing property rights regimes and highways among the
classic examples of public goods).
16. See, e.g., Fearnside, supra note 7, at 738, 744 (describing support for roads
in Amazon by Brazilian officials, investors, agribusiness interests).
17. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, U. ILL. L. REv.
275, 290-97 (2000) (exploring various reasons for slow development of environmental
market mechanisms).
18. For a survey of the efforts to preserve roadless areas in the United States, see
Federico Cheever, Not Quite Wilderness: The Development of Roadless Area Protection on
Forest Service and BLM Lands (University of Denver Sturm College of Law Legal
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-37, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id=723149. A number of Latin
American countries have created forest reserves for indigenous peoples, though there are
many complaints that they are insufficiently enforced. See, e.g., Jo M. Pasqualucci, The
Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 6
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 281, 315-19 (2006) (describing complaints against various Latin
American countries for insufficient protection of indigenous lands against encroachers).
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among those who want greater access to the now-blocked resources.' 9 Similarly,
new forms of tradable environmental entitlements also use a blocking-off
technique, although that aspect has not been much stressed in the legal literature:
this is the "cap" in cap-and-trade, the portion of the resource not subject to use or
trade or to the property-like tradable entitlements. These blocking features of
environmental property rights render them even more difficult to establish and
sustain than conventional property, for reasons that Gary Libecap describes: a cap
on an environmental resource brings only uncertain payoffs, and those payoffs
may be unevenly distributed, while the whole notion of a cap is opposed by those
20who can benefit from leaving the resource open.
These ascending difficulties for environmental property rights may
explain why some environmentalists have in effect borrowed from a more old-
fashioned and informal kind of property infrastructure-a property infrastructure
that is fine-grained but "sticky" or "fuzzy." Some contemporary environmental
laws run counter to the modernist, simplifying trend of property rights definitions
and instead turn environmental property rights into the fuzzy entitlements more
characteristic of informal and small scale, community-based property regimes-that
is, rights to be part of a process of consultation.
In Part I, this Article presents a series of issues about roads. Do they in
fact depend on public efforts? The answer, to anticipate, is yes and no, but mostly
yes. Next, how and why do roads have such dramatic impacts on the surrounding
environment? Some reasons are easy to deduce-actual physical construction, for
example, as well as the influx of new people that roads bring. But other reasons are
subtler, particularly the role that roads play both in degrading local institutional
constraints on resource use and in fostering wider commercial development with
an attendant drift toward regional monocultures.
Part II then turns to the conventional modernist property regimes that
often follow roads, finding some differences but also several very important
features shared with the roads that so often precede them. Formal rights too can
degrade preexisting resource management regimes without supplanting them,
leading to considerable instability and environmental destruction. But even when
formal rights are successfully implanted, their most notable shared features with
roads are their joint drive toward expanded commerce and the drive of commerce
itself toward environmental monocultures.
Part III examines the efforts to deploy modernist property rights for
environmental purposes. This Part tracks the manner in which environmental
property rights in some ways match up with, but in some ways sharply diverge
from conventional modernist property rights-both in the goals of the enterprises,
19. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., In the Utah Wilderness, A Question of
Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at A12 (describing Utah counties' resistance to
federal and environmentalists' efforts to declare certain areas roadless); James Langman,
Bolivian Settlers Push for Parkland Acreage, EcOAMERICAS, Sept. 2007, at 4 (noting
settlers' protests to gain greater access to Madidi National Park for farming, logging, and
ranching).
20. Libecap, supra note 12, at 405-08 (describing reasons for lag in controlling
greenhouse gases).
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and in the difficulties that environmental property rights regimes face. This Part
then briefly takes up alternative types of environmental protection, particularly
consultative regulatory forms, comparing these to the sticky or fuzzy property
rights more characteristic of informal, small-scale, bottom-up property rights
regimes.
The Article concludes with a note of caution: that in a global economy,
we will be hard put to move forward environmentally without enlisting modernist
property ideas, but that we should not be surprised to find that modernist rights
regimes generate an environmentalist reaction in favor of sticky, fine-grained
deliberations about entitlements. We should not be surprised by this outcome
because environmental property rights in the end serve goals that are in many ways
diametrically opposed to the normal commercial purposes that dominate roads and
modernist property rights. The quest for alternative approaches is in itself a signal
that environmental issues pose significant challenges for modernist property rights
regimes.
I. BIG ROADS
A. Bottom up and top down
Is it really the case that roads and rights require a public infrastructure?
Are there not "bottom up" roadways, as well as "bottom up" rights regimes-that
is, roads and rights that do not depend at all on formal government and law, but
rather on the initiative of individuals or groups acting on their own? The answer is,
"yes, but ......
Some of the storied and romantic roads of the past are quite obvious
examples of bottom-up roads. The Silk Road between medieval Europe and Asia is
an example, as is our own Oregon Trail.21 Traders and travelers have long found
routes to desired locations, and more traders and travelers have followed, if not
directly in the pathways of the first, then at least more or less in the same locations.
Even more easily traversed than overland routes are waterways, which have long
been called "highways," 22 just as routes across the open seas are known as
"roads., 23 It was not government or law that created these bottom-up roads, but
rather people acting on their own, what one might call the "unorganized public. '24
21. For a brief history and description of the Silk Road(s), see Oliver Wild, The
Silk Road (1992), available at http://www.ess.uci.edu/-oliver/silk.html. For a similar quick
overview of the Oregon Trail and its travelers, see All About the Oregon Trail,
http://www.isu.edu/-trinmich/Allabout.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
22. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (noting admiralty
definition of navigable waters as those capable of use "as highways for commerce").
23. This language is encapsulated in the "rules of the road" for appropriate
conduct of vessels at sea. See, e.g., Rick Rambo, Admiralty Law, 31 TEX. TECH L. REv. 313,
320 (2000) (describing liability for collision at sea as depending on the statutory and
customary rules of the road).
24. At least that is what I have called this kind of public. Carol M. Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 711, 720-21 (1986) (distinguishing unorganized public from government). Others
seem to find the idea useful as well. See, e.g., Karl P. Baker & Dwight H. Merriam,
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Nevertheless, these bottom-up routes have obvious limitations. They are
difficult and dangerous because they are largely unimproved and unpoliced. Their
difficulties and dangers deter widespread or frequent use; these roads (the Oregon
Trail, for example) have often attracted users who basically travel them only one-
way, once in a lifetime. In turn, sporadic use generally means that bottom-up roads
have a limited impact on the communities at either end. Marco Polo, for example,
took only one round trip to China.25 The cultural impact of his outbound trip on his
Chinese hosts was necessarily curtailed when his two clerical companions took
fright and abandoned the enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean; and while his trip
home brought him personal riches and much encouraged Venetian trade and
cultural exchange with the East, that trade concentrated on high-value luxury
goods, a rather limited notion of commerce.26 Those were very important
exchanges over the course of centuries, but they pale when compared with the
speed, volume, and variety of trade that flows across top-down roads.
27
Bottom-up roads often do play an important role in top-down overland
roadbuilding. Top-down roads (in which I include canals and railroads) are likely
to follow the paths set out by bottom-up ones: smoothing, paving, and policing the
roads that the unorganized public has already created. Interstate 80 runs west
through the Sierras roughly following the route that newcomers to California took
on their own well over a century ago, passing near the location where the Donner
Party met its demise.28 On the other hand, some top-down roads may run through
areas that were previously more or less untraveled, like Alaska's Dalton Highway,
Indelible Public Interests in Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 275 (2005) (using concept of "unorganized public" as constraint on
regulatory decisions about public land).
25. JOHN LARNER, MARCO POLO AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE WORLD 39-45
(1999).
26. William Dalrymple, The Venetian Treasure Hunt, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, July 19,
2007, at 29; see also DEBORAH HOWARD, VENICE AND THE EAST: THE IMPACT OF THE
ISLAMIC WORLD ON VENETIAN ARCHITECTURE 1100-1500, at 116-17 (2000) (describing
medieval traveler's comment that Venetian warehouses were filled with merchandise,
naming as examples high value goods: "spices, rare cloths, silk draperies"). For the impact
of a modem road, see Amy Waldman, Building a Superhighway Mile By Mile, India Paves
a Smoother Road to Its Future, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at AI I (describing changes in
wake of partially-completed highway).
27. According to the national Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the vehicle
miles traveled through rural areas alone on the Interstate system in 2004 was 266,996
million miles. See Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 1-33: Roadway Vehicle-Miles
Traveled (VMT) and VMT per Lane-Mile by Functional Class, available at
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national-transportation_statistics/html/table_01_33.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
28. The Donner Party's fateful winter camp was in the vicinity of Truckee,
California, now on Interstate 80. For maps of their route, including a map of the location
today showing Interstate 80, see Maps of the Donner Party, in Daniel M. Rosen, The
Donner Party, http://www.donnerpartydiary.com/maps.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
HeinOnline -- 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 416 2008
20081 BIG ROADS, BIG RIGHTS 417
built to service the Alaska Pipeline and stretching from just north of Fairbanks to
Prudhoe Bay in the Arctic.
29
Whether they follow old routes or blaze new ones, top-down roads are
likely to serve vastly more travelers than the intrepid adventurers who wend their
way along the bottom-up roads. Transportation infrastructure is such a
quintessentially public function that for millennia, roads and waterways have been
at the core of western legal conceptions of public property.3 0 In our own law,
roadways have been the central example of the legitimate use of the power of
eminent domain, and eminent domain for roads is approved even by those who
vehemently disapprove of eminent domain for other kinds of economic
development.
Why have roads been so important to governments? For the Romans, a
major reason for roads was military-control of an expanding empire.32 Military
reasoning continues in our own major road construction; the interstate system was
originally billed the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.33 But
for the Romans somewhat,34 and much more for modem governments, the
overwhelming function of roads (as well as navigable waterways) has been to
promote commerce. a Roads bring distant communities into contact with one
another. Roads allow the exchange of ideas, sights, and above all, goods and
services. In a word, roads expand markets, and all other things being equal, bigger
markets are better for the economy. Bigger markets allow specialization and gains
from trade, and they make property more valuable because it can be turned to more
specialized uses and traded for a greater range of goods.36
Because roads enhance commerce and wealth, governments often either
build them themselves or subsidize privately-developed roads, as the United States
government subsidized canals and railways with checkerboard land grants.3 The
29. See Michael Finkel, Journey to the Top of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1996, at 17 (describing solitary drive along Dalton Highway to Alaskan northern coast).
30. Rose, supra note 24, at 723-30 (describing strong traditional doctrines of
pubhcness of roads and waterways).
31. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506, 512 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing roads along with canals, railroads, ferries and parks as
"quintessentially public goods" for purposes of eminent domain, unlike the economic
development project at issue in the case).
32. T. W. POTTER, ROMAN ITALY 127, 131 (1987) (describing military
motivations in Roman roadbuilding).
33. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP.
L.J. 235, 314 (2003) (describing interstate system name, Eisenhower Administration's
interest in defense aspects of highways).
34. POTTER, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that one Roman road, the Via Salaria,
was named for the salt trade).
35. Rose, supra note 24, at 744; see also Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and
Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 97 (2003).
36. Rose, supra note 24, at 774.
37. Dempsey, supra note 33, at 248-50 (describing land grants to railroads);
Nels Ackerson, Right of Way Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies: Status Report, Emerging
Issues, and Opportunities, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 177, 182 (2003) (noting earlier
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expectation was that these transportation lanes would attract people to previously
unsettled areas, raising the value of the land and repaying the cost of the roads
themselves.38  Not surprisingly, roadbuilding has important and powerful
constituencies. Not only do many political officials want roads for military
purposes 39 and economic development, but residents, settlers, and would-be
developers of remote areas all press for roads that open up access and add to
economic potential.4
Notice that roads are not the products of small governments. Your village
may have streets, mews, and alleys, but roads are the creatures of bigger public
bodies: counties, states, nations-or empires, as with the Roman roads or with the
sea lanes called "roads" that Britain's navy once policed. Streets and alleys are
cozy and familiar, but roads are decidedly different.
Because of their public goods characteristics and their expense, major
roads are unlikely to be built by private actors, though there are exceptions when
the private payoffs are great enough, as in the roads to oilfields in Alaska or
Ecuador.41 But in the usual case, roads are built by governments, and those
govemments must have the capacity to undertake such a major capital
investment-stability, access to capital and expertise, and a reasonably transparent
administrative structure.42 Like their builders, roads are ambitious, cosmopolitan,
checkerboard grants to canals); see also PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLic LAND LAw 341-
56 (1968) (describing precedent for railroad checkerboard grants in road and canal grants).
38. Dempsey, supra note 33, at 249-50 (describing finances, expectations of
higher value for both railroad lands and government-retained land).
39. Id. at 314 (describing how impressed Eisenhower was with the military uses
of the German Autobahn system).
40. See, e.g., Fearnside, supra note 7, at 738, 744 (describing investor and
landowner support for Amazonian roads); James Brooke, Nalaikh Journal: Mongols Go
From Camels to Jeeps and a Superhighway, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A4 (describing
official and popular support for new highway, enthusiasm for development potential); Juan
Forero, Demonstrations Cut Oil Output From Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at A6
(describing protests demanding road funds in Ecuadorian interior).
41. Both roads have been extremely controversial for their environmental
effects. See, e.g., Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental
Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1609-13 (1972)
(describing early NEPA suit against Alaska pipeline and haul road permit); Judith
Kimerling, Disregarding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected Natural
Areas and Indigenous Homelands in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 849, 849 (1991) (noting that oil company roads have opened large areas in
Ecuadorian Amazon to settlers). Some California cities have experimented with private toll
lanes to ease traffic congestion. See, e.g., Lathrop B. Nelson, Comment, Unclogging
Virginia's Roads: Aligning Commuter Incentives in Northern Virginia, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 185,
222-23 (2000) (describing San Diego and Orange County experiments); see also Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying
California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1251 (2000) (describing effect of toll charge
on commuter acceptance).
42. Cf Waldman, supra note 26 (noting that India's new superhighway has been
impeded by local officials seeking bribes).
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imperial, and often indifferent to their own impact on local conditions. 43 They are
among the most important physical engines of globalization, or as much
globalization as any particular government is capable of delivering.
Globalization, of course, opens local niche markets to competition.
Shopkeepers may find themselves outcompeted by better-stocked stores in
neighboring towns, or patrons may find that their former servants have gone off to
exercise newly-found talents in other places. What happened to the itinerant knife-
sharpener? The milkman? By opening up markets, roads have contributed to the
demise of those niches as well as customer reliance on them. For some of the same
reasons, roads have had a substantial impact on environmental niches as well.
B. Roads and the environment
Bottom-up roads, crude though they may be, certainly can have serious
environmental impacts. Wagon marks are still visible today on old trails that once
carried settlers across the United States. Those very trails deposited substantial
numbers of people on the West Coast, and the new arrivals had major impacts on
the environment as they fanned out into the countryside or settled in ever-
expanding towns and cities. The discovery of valuable resource lodes can induce
people to find their own routes to the sites of hoped-for instant riches, and once on
the scene, these small-scale miners are perfectly willing to trash the environment,
as in the foothills of California in the mid-nineteenth century or the gold areas of
the Amazon today." Moreover, informal roads like these are undoubtedly less
amenable to monitoring and regulation than are larger public roads.
But formal top-down roads have an even more striking impact on the
environment than bottom-up ones. The first kind of environmental impact of roads
is simply the physical change wrought by a road itself. Roads in forested areas
obviously necessitate felling trees and often the disposal of construction detritus
onsite or nearby, but in addition, the mere presence of roads often fragments plant
and animal habitat, preventing migrations across accustomed paths.45 Incidentally,
43. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 32, at 133 (describing Roman "ruthlessness" in
building road network to bypass old Etruscan rival city, which subsequently languished).
44. See Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 756 (C.C.
Cal. 1884) (describing great quantities of debris clogging California river as result of Gold
Rush and later hydraulic mining, enjoining further deposits as impediment to navigation);
John Batt & David C. Short, The Jurisprudence of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: A Law, Science, and Policy Explication of Certain Aspects
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 229, 270-72 (1993) (describing modem Amazon-region goldminers or
garampeiros, who cut swaths through the forest, tear up streams and cause widespread
mercury contamination); see also Madeline Cohen, Note, A New Menu for the Hard Rock
Cafe: International Mining Ventures and Environmental Cooperation in Developing
Countries, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 141 (1996) (asserting that very small independent
operators' mineral extraction "plagues the developing world" due to environmental
degradation, citing examples in Africa, Brazil, Latin America).
45. JUDITH KIMERLrNG, AMAZON CRUDE 75-77 (1991) (describing roads in
Amazon as destroying vegetation directly and through waste deposits, also fragmenting
habitat and disrupting animal migration paths in Amazon, as well as compacting soil); see
also Jamison Colburn, Bioregional Conservation May Mean Taking Habitat, 37 ENVTL. L.
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this fragmentation effect is certainly not unknown for human populations; witness
the way that an urban freeway separates urban sub-communities from one another
in any number of big cities in the United States, isolating neighborhood
populations that would otherwise intermingle.46
A second kind of environmental impact that roads exert concerns new
movement into and out of road-served areas. Roads encourage out-migrations from
previously undisturbed areas, perhaps most frighteningly, outward-spreading
disease pathogens. 47 But migrations into a newly road-served community may be
even more disruptive. When a new road clears the way through a forest, previously
absent "edge" plants may establish themselves in disturbed soils and sunlight;
these in turn damage wildlife and provide fuel for even more destructive fires, as
in the Brazilian Amazon.48
Even more potentially disruptive is the human influx into areas served by
new roads. In the Ecuadorian Amazon region, when the oil firm Texaco explored
for and developed oil resources, the company built numerous roads. Thereafter,
with the encouragement of an Ecuadorian government anxious to relieve land
hunger elsewhere in the country, numerous settlers followed the roads and cleared
nearby areas of what was once forested land.49 In Brazil's Amazon region, major
new roads have been augmented rapidly by networks of smaller secondary roads
leading out to logging operations and settlers' clearances. 50 In this way, the large
public roads encourage further damaging effects of informal roads.
The reason roads encourage incursions into previously undamaged
ecosystems is because they link previously remote areas to outside commercial
markets. Settlers go into the forest when roads are present because they can exploit
forest resources and then deliver their products to distant markets. Once on the
scene, those settlers may encounter few well-enforced property rights to channel
249, 265-66 (describing development of a new professional field of "road ecology" to study
impact of roads in U.S. northern forests).
46. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101, 114-21 (2006) (discussing rerouting of Chicago urban
freeways in the 1950s to avoid Catholic churches and some parishes, but running through
other parishes as well as minority neighborhoods).
47. See, e.g., Research from the United States Reveals New Findings on
Epidemiology, GASTROENTEROLOGY WK., Mar. 26, 2007, at 257 (reporting study of how
roads in previously roadless area of northern coastal Ecuador encouraged transmission of
diarrheal pathogens).
48. See William F. Laurance et al., Rain Forest Fragmentation and the
Proliferation of Successional Trees, 87 ECOLOGY 469, 476-77, 479-80 (2006) (describing
"edge effects" from deforestation); see also Phillip M. Fearnside, The Fractured Landscape,
AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 1, 2007, at All (noting that logging accompanies roadbuilding and
contributes to drier soils and fires).
49. Chris Jochnick, A Seat at the Table, in 1 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
41(2001).
50. Fearside, supra note 48 (noting that new roads link "endogenous roads" and
especially citing new highway BR-319 with planned side roads as causing forest
fragmentation).
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development, or they may pay little attention to any such rights that exist5 '-a
scenario well known to encourage overexploitation of resources.52 In the Brazilian
pattern of deforestation, roadbuilding has engendered logging that serves remote
markets, but much of this activity is done illegally on indigenous or public lands or
other insufficiently guarded private property.53
At a later stage, logging and other short-term exploitation tends to give
way to longer time-horizon activities like ranching and farming.54 Unlike the short-
termers, farmers and other long-term interest groups are more concerned to
establish secure property rights, but all these groups are alike in that they all want
to sell their products in outside markets." Without roads (or waterway "roads") to
transport both logs and farm products to market, there would be little point either
in cutting trees for lumber or in clearing land for agriculture.
On the environmental front, perhaps the most important but most subtle
effect of roads is that, by linking areas commercially, roads tend to discourage
local diversity in resource use. Roads expand potential market areas, and expanded
markets encourage regional commercial specialization.56 With trade across
different local areas, different areas gravitate toward their respective comparative
advantages. This is why environmentalists are so concerned about the paving of an
international highway from the Brazilian Amazon to the Peruvian border: the
Brazilian road, together with the road across Peru, will enable soybean growers of
the Amazon to look to markets across the Pacific in China.57 That fact is very
likely to encourage vastly more soybean production in the Amazon-but regional
51. The California Gold Rush offers a notorious example, where miners simply
trespassed on Federal public lands and murdered local Indians; however, they did manage to
organize relatively short-term claims regimes for their own mining activities. See Andrea
McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 771, 771-72 (2004); see also Phillip M. Feamside, BR-319: Brazil's Manaus-
Porto Velho Highway and the Potential Impact of Linking the Arc of Deforestation to
Central Amazonia, 38 ENVTL. MGMT. 705, 709 (2006) (noting roadside settlers' invasions of
adjacent public lands).
52. For a classic treatment, see Frank Knight, Some Fallacies in the
Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECoN. 582, 584-87 (1924) (comparing exploitation
levels of owned and unowned resources, using examples of roads and farms).
53. See Larry Rohter, Loggers, Scorning the Law, Ravage the Amazon Jungle,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, §1, at 16 (describing massive illegal logging, using roads for
transport).
54. See Bradley S. Romig, Agriculture in Brazil and Its Effect on Deforestation
and the Landless Movement: A Government's Attempt to Balance Agricultural Success and
Social Collateral Damage, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 87-90 (2006) (noting succession
from deforestation to ranching and agriculture).
55. ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 15-16 (noting that more settled activities
creates more demand for secure property rights).
56. See, e.g., Romig, supra note 54, at 86, 90 (attributing great growth in land
devoted to cattle ranching, soybean production in formerly forested Amazon area to export
markets).
57. See Lucien 0. Chauvin, Peruvian Committee to Oversee Preservation
Aspects of Atlantic-Pacific Road Project, 29 BNA INT'L ENvTL. REP., 766 (2006)
(describing Inter-Oceanic Highway South project, Brazil's support to encourage agricultural
and mineral exports, environmentalist concerns for impact on rainforest).
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specialization in soybeans comes at the cost of losses to the ancient forest.
Enlarged markets make many more products available to everyone, at prices that
are generally lower because of regional specialization; but by encouraging regional
specialization, roads in effect encourage a mosaic with larger pieces, i.e., internally
non-diversified, commercially-linked monocultures.
The Amazon is of course not the first place to experience this drift toward
regional specialization and linked monocultures. William Cronon has shown how
in the nineteenth century, new modes of transportation gave Chicago a regionally
specialized hinterland, with timber coming from Michigan and Wisconsin, wheat
from the plains, and meat from the west-leading, of course, to the deforestation
of the upper Midwest, the replacement of a diverse tallgrass prairie by grain
monocultures, and the introduction of cattle ranching after the demise of the
buffalo.58 Here too, many of these activities initially ignored any indigenous land
management practices, and even formal United States law.59 Long before
Chicago's development came an even more striking example of a similar set of
phenomena in the long-drawn-out enclosure movement in Britain. The economic
historian Carl Dahman attributes the enclosure drive to better transportation and
the expansion of European markets from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.
60
Expanded markets meant that landowners did not have to depend on an
economically-diversified local community to produce a complete range of goods
and services on the spot. Instead, landowners could "enclose" the village-based
mixtures of individual plots and common fields, and turn these entire areas into
sheep-grazing or grain-growing monocultures, trading the products all over Great
Britain and abroad while the former villagers attempted to find other
occupations.
61
In recent years, copyright opponents have cited the English enclosure
movement as a metaphor for the "privatization" or "propertization" of previously
open information. Yet it was public infrastructure-roads and other transportation
improvement-that lay the foundations for the enclosure of the villages and
58. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST
151-55, 200-04 (1991) (describing lumbering and deforestation); id at 97-102 (describing
introduction of European grains and destruction of native grasses); id. at 213-225
(describing demise of bison and introduction of cattle).
59. See, e.g., id. at 101 (describing settler farmers suppression of fire, unlike
Indians, resulting in alteration of prairie landscape); KAREN MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND
POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM
169-83 (2002) (noting that nineteenth century western "cattle barons" flouted US public
lands laws).
60. CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 153-70 (1980) (noting poor transport as a
factor in local self-sufficient agriculture, improved transportation as a factor in economic
integration and enclosure of local common fields); see also J. M. NEESON, COMMONERS:
COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820, at 220 (1993)
(summarizing enclosure's displacement of former village agricultural communities).
61. DAHLMAN, supra note 60, at 145-59 (describing regional specialization
accompanying enclosure).
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common fields in the earlier era. 62 More than that, this public infrastructure of
roads made it possible to reduce localized economic diversification. If roads link
you to the world, why bother to make everything for yourself? It makes so much
more economic sense to specialize in what you do best and trade for the rest.
Notice that commercial development does not undermine diversity in a
broader sense, particularly with respect to consumption. Indeed, the world over,
resources and products from everywhere become available in dizzying arrays.
With widespread commerce, it would be no surprise to find that the residents of
Tierra del Fuego follow internet-based European newscasts on a computer
assembled in China. The diversity that is undermined, however, is local diversity,
particularly in terms of production, because commerce fosters regional
specialization and thus regional monocultures.
II. BIG RIGHTS-PROPERTY RIGHTS AS PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Does property require public infrastructure?
I turn now to the other form of public infrastructure in question, the
development of modernist property rights that often follow some time after the
infrastructure of roads. But first, the same question arises with property rights as
arises with roads: do property rights require a public infrastructure at all? This is
actually a subject of considerable philosophical importance. John Locke's famous
exposition of property argued that property precedes government, and that the
protection of property is both the justification for the establishment of government
and the measure of its legitimacy. 63 Libertarian thinkers are, roughly speaking,
followers of Locke in this view.
64
But can property rights precede government? It seems quite clear that
they can, though as we shall see, they are rights of a limited character. Property
rights govern relationships between people, and hence they are always a part of
some social system or other, but those social systems need not be formal
governments. Complete strangers participate in informal short-term property
arrangements when they take places in line at a ticket window. Longer-term
entitlements tend to require longer-term community understandings, but Elinor
Ostrom and her admirers and collaborators have written extensively about many
such community-based property regimes, which may embed quite elaborate
individual entitlements. 65 These community-based regimes exist throughout the
62. See Rose, supra note 35, at 101 (describing and critiquing argument that
intellectual property is new "enclosure" movement).
63. JOHN LOCKE, 2D TREATISE, §§ 27-36 (outlining labor theory of property); id.
§§ 124, 127, 138 (describing government's goal as the preservation of property).
64. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171-74 (1975)
(using Lockean property rights analysis to critique idea of redistributionist state).
65. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (theory of commons plus a number of
examples); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL
RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McKay & James M. Acheson eds., 1990) [hereinafter THE QUESTION
OF THE COMMONS] (collection of essays on various community-based management regimes);
see also Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons Environmental Scholarship and the
20081
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world, and some have endured for very long periods, organizing community
members' access to fisheries, grazing meadows, and small-scale irrigation systems,
among other things.
66
Community-based informal rights structures tend to be quite complex,
however, and individual property rights within them are complicated as well.
Villagers in pre-enclosure medieval England owned land in a complex structure of
scattered fields that rotated in and out of common grazing; and since a major issue
was the distribution of manure, the communities paid much attention to the times
and locations where livestock grazed.67 James Carrier has described the informal
property rights of contemporary fishermen in Papua New Guinea, who might be
entitled only to particular kinds of fish or particular kinds of netting techniques,
while other fishermen have rights to other kinds of fish or techniques in the same
reef-and net owners are also subject to overarching expectations that they will
treat others generously.
68
Because community-based property rights structures tend to be
complicated, community dispute management and resolution is complicated too,
depending upon gossip, informal measures of self-help, and often upon a local
bigman for consultation and decision. 69 Perhaps most important, informal property
rights are not easily alienable, particularly to outsiders. The very complexity of
community-based rights structures throws up barriers to trade, especially to those
who are not already familiar with the system.70 Indeed, whether intentionally or
accidentally, one of-the functions of these complex rights stUcturcs is to ma-+ntan
the stability of the community, both in its population and in its informal
governance, and that means discouraging rapid trade, especially to outsiders.
And so, the answer to whether property rights precede government seems
to be yes, one may concede that property rights do precede government. But these
are not the kinds of property rights that make the modern commercial world hum,
Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 393, 400 (1997) (describing Ostrom
group's methodology of "institutional analysis and development" [lAD]).
66. OSTROM, supra note 65, at 61-87 (describing longstanding community-based
grazing and irrigation systems); id at 49-52 (describing community fishery).
67. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 146-48 (2000) (describing elaborate ownership patterns
aimed at fair distribution of manure).
68. James G. Carrier, Marine Tenure and Conservation in Papua New Guinea,
in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 65, at 142, 147, 158-59 (1990) (describing
complex rights, distribution patterns based on generosity).
69. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 55-64 (1991) (describing role of gossip and self-help in settling informal
claims among ranchers, prior to resort to law); Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land:
Law and Space in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 812-15
(1999) (describing complications, role of tribal chiefs in settling rights).
70. See Banner, supra note 69, at 813 (describing Maori methods of claiming
land as "baffling" to English settlers); see also James C. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs
Revisited: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in Maine Lobster Fishing, in
THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 65, at 37, 44-45 (describing island
communities' network of informal rules that keep prize lobster fishing areas in hands of
long-established fishing families).
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and they are probably not the kinds of property rights that stimulate much interest
even for modem libertarians. They are often too complex and too much embedded
in particular communities to encourage trade or to create widespread opportunities
for the accumulation of wealth. 71
The kinds of property rights that count in a modem commercial society
are the products of a public legal infrastructure. 72 To be sure, even in commercial
transactions, modernist rights are often overlaid by informal rights arrangements
among people who know one another; but the basic role of modernist rights is to
pry open economic activity to strangers, by offering the trump of "endgame
norms" when relationship-specific, informal arrangements are not feasible. 73
Minimally, for long-term holdings, these rights regimes include relatively simply-
defined entitlements; 74 a public recording or registration system that is available to
all for inspection; some kind of effective official policing for enforcement
purposes; and a dispute resolution system that can reliably enforce property rights
and contractual arrangements about those rights.
B. The echoes of roads: impacts of modernist rights on traditional entitlements
Modernist property rights regimes affect traditional informal property
regimes in ways that echo and extend the social and environmental effects of new
roads. First of all, while modernist rights regimes have no obvious physical effects
comparable to the physical alterations that roads cause in surrounding landscapes,
modernist rights can work in tandem with roads to undermine preceding systems
of informal entitlement and resource management, as was the case, for example,
with the British enclosure movement. As new transportation routes brought the
countryside inside the ambit of a wider trade, landowners bought out villagers
71. Cf Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange Without Impartial Law: The
Community Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109, 109-15, 135-37 (2004)
(describing growth of medieval trade that went beyond village level, but depended on
collective responsibility of all merchants from any given city; system supplanted by formal
law as trade grew and merchants became more heterogeneous).
72. Libecap, supra note 12, at 384 (noting that governmental action is necessary
to define property rights where large numbers of heterogeneous persons compete for
resource); cf ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 15-16 (observing that secure title requires
governmental action, but that governments may not always provide this security).
73. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 766-71 (1999)
(distinguishing "relationship-preserving norms" in specific business relationships from
"endgame norms" after rupture, and calling for enforcement of latter). Bernstein's analysis
suggests that formal, legal norms or "endgame norms" allow parties to deal with each other
as strangers.
74. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have made a particular point of the
necessity for simplicity where property rights are binding on wide audiences. Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1, 32-34 (2000) [hereinafter Optimal Standardization]
(arguing that relatively simple rights are necessary in widely-marketed property rights); see
also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, Ill YALE L.J. 357, 385-88 (2001) (arguing that simple forms are necessary
when property rights are good against the world).
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voluntarily or by statutory forced sales, precisely in order to dispose of the
elaborate rights structures associated with village agriculture and commons
management. 75 Newly simplified land rights permitted the landowners to take over
entire land areas uncluttered by all these overlapping rights and instead to devote
the whole areas to local grazing or agricultural monocultures.76 Stuart Banner's
work has chronicled a similar pattern in New Zealand: in the middle of the
nineteenth century, after decades of settler frustration in attempting to negotiate the
complexities of land purchases from Maori communities, British settlers' courts
and legislatures enabled Maori individuals to sell parcels on a "geographic" basis,
without regard to the previous set of multiple overlapping informal use rights.
77
The subsequent sales of these modernist entitlements-even though voluntarily
undertaken by individuals on both sides-thoroughly undermined the previous
Maori informal rights structures, and as those structures sank they took clan
political cohesion with them. 78 Similarly in Hawai'i, the mid-century legal changes
known as the "Great Mahele" permitted non-Hawai'ians to purchase land in
modernist, geographic parcels, whereupon the new owners widely disregarded
villagers' previous customary use claims for pasturage and gathering. 79 Likewise,
pre-colonial social and economic patterns among Africans were much disrupted by
the introduction of modernist colonial property regimes that fixed entitlements
geographically and permitted their alienation to outsiders, contrary to prior
practice. This is certainly not to say that modernist rights always triumph or that
traditionalist structures give way easily.81 It is just to say that these two kinds of
regimes contain deep incompatoilities; ' tends toward simplicity and
governs relationships with strangers, whereas the other tends toward complexity
and governs relationships in close-knit groups.
82
In a second and related dimension, the parallel between roads and
modernist rights regimes is even more striking. Just as roads allow those inside a
75. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English
Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 221, 253-55, 258-60 (1995) (describing sixteenth century
enclosures for grazing, later enclosures for agriculture, along with legal developments).
76. Id; Dahlman, supra note 60, at 147-48.
77. Banner, supra note 69, at 830-32, 844-46.
78. Id. at 844-46.
79. See Jocelyn B. Garovoy, "Ua Koe Ke Kuleana 0 Na Kanaka" (Reserving the
Rights of Native Tenants). Integrating Kuleana Rights and Land Trust Priorities in Hawaii,
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 523, 525-30 (2005) (describing Native Hawai'ian loss of land and
customary usages after introduction of modem property tenure); see also Stuart Banner,
Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure and Legal Strategy in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii,
39 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 273, 287-93 (2005) (describing course of the Great Mahele
legislation).
80. See Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest
for Sustainability in Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All That Is Needed?,
18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 197, 231-34 (2006) (describing disruption to traditional
African regimes by colonial land titling).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 92-111.
82. Cf Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and
Audience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1117-19 (2003) (noting that simple or "extensive"
property rules communicate to a wide audience, whereas more detailed and complex
property rules are more appropriate to small community).
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previously roadless area to move out, so do modernist property rights. A villager
with no more than informal, customary property rights may be unable to sell what
she has at all; but when the villager acquires formal title and can sell to anyone she
pleases, she can exit the community and take along the sale proceeds-a feature
that may in itself encourage exit. Sometimes exit can take subtler forms as well.
An urban example makes this clearer. One of the most active proponents for
formal title has been Hernando DeSoto, the Peruvian economist who believes that
squatter communities could enter the developed world's economy if the current
informal claims can be transformed into formal land titles. The reason, according
to DeSoto, is that with formal title an owner can raise capital; someone with no
more than a modest cottage can use it as collateral for a loan to purchase, say, a
sewing machine and start a tailoring business.8 3 But according to one study, formal
title did not so much enable squatters to borrow money as it enabled them simply
to leave, at least temporarily, ex anding their employment options by allowing
them to take more distant jobs. R These activities were now safe because the
squatter did not have to stay home to guard the house against takeover by some
other squatter or a local boss. 85
There is a third and closely-related parallel between roads and modernist
property rights: just as roads permit outsiders to enter a previously roadless area,
formal property rights can reinforce this encouragement, particularly by contrast to
community-based regimes. Community-based rights structures are generally
hostile to new entry. Because these rights systems are often so complex, outsiders
may not understand them, and even if they do, individual rights-holders would
seldom be able to sell their rights to strangers without the approval, formal or
informal, of the surrounding community. The example of the English settlers in
New Zealand was described above. The settlers made little headway in acquiring
land until the English themselves changed the law to allow a modernist form of
property transaction-that is, individual Maori land sales, in which all that
mattered was a willing buyer and a willing seller.86 In some Alpine Swiss
communities, the right to graze livestock in common fields is quite complicated,
and it is not alienable at all to outsiders; grazing rights can only accrue to inherited
"citizenship" that goes back to medieval times.8 7 By contrast, one of the most
83. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 51, 57-58 (2003) (arguing that
holders of secure title can use property to finance businesses).
84. Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in
Peru, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1561, 1584 (2007) (study showing that titling increases claimants'
ability to work outside home).
85. See Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, n.78 (2006) (describing threats to
informal squatter tenure).
86. See supra text accompanying note 77.
87. See ROBERT McC. NETTING, BALANCING ON AN ALP: ECOLOGICAL CHANGE
AND CONTINUITY IN A Swiss MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY 78 (1981) (describing how Alpine
village's common field rights are available only to longstanding citizens). James Acheson's
work on the "lobster gangs" of Maine offers another much-cited example: whatever the
state's formal regime, the islanders' informal right to fish for lobsters is a closely guarded
one, not alienable or even easily transferable; strangers cannot acquire those rights until
HeinOnline -- 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 427 2008
428 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:409
salient features of modernist property rights is that they are alienable to anyone. De
Soto's ideas for raising capital in squatter communities rests on the supposition
that individual owners can mortgage their formal property rights to outsiders like
banks. Presumably if the loan fails, the bank-a stranger to the community-
becomes the new owner, and presumably the bank, too, could sell to anyone.
Formal property's openness to outsiders raises yet a fourth parallel: both
roads and formal property rights diminish local cultural and political diversity.
When strangers buy parcels in an area where informal rights once dominated, the
newcomers may or may not pay attention to local customary practice. They need
not heed local dispute-resolution methods because they have the protection of
larger state institutions. Local tribunals and established leaders lose their influence
and political clout in the squatter communities of Ecuador,8 8 as they did earlier in
the Maori communities of New Zealand. 9 One may look at this phenomenon as a
regrettable loss of communal decision-making, or one may look at it as a release
from local tyrants, but either way, diverse local social and political organization
fades where property rights open up the door to strangers.
Fundamentally, contemporary public institutions are always under some
pressure to support property rights that are simple and fungible, because rights of
this sort can best serve commercial markets. Modernist property rights have to fall
into relatively standardized forms so that all the players are on the same page with
their transactions, and-a point that Merrill's and Smith's theoretical work
part;cu larly stresses-so that none of the players has to search for ;tii os.ratic
wrinkles of entitlement. 90 Those wrinkles would raise search costs for all potential
purchasers and impede the free flow of property from lower- to higher-value uses.
Many of the property categories that Blackstone noted-rights like advowsons, the
privilege of nominating the local parson-have simply vanished from modernist
land rights.9 1 And if advowsons are gone, one can be very sure that a particular
villager's right to fish with a particular net in a particular spot on the beach is
gone, too, along with the community dispute resolution mechanisms that would
have upheld the right.
On the other hand, simplicity and standardization do not always triumph.
they have lived in the community for a long time and shown their proficiency and
acceptance of local customs. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 63-70
(1988)
88. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled A Study of Formal and
Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 992-93 (2002) (noting how
informal urban land claims depend on local bosses); see also Atuahene, supra note 85, at
776-77 (land titling gives owners an escape from dependence on local bosses).
89. See Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market
Structure in Colonial New Zealand, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 47, 54 (2000) (describing
community chieftains' role in land sales prior to establishment of formal individual property
rights).
90. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 74, at 32-34
(describing standardized forms as reducing information costs to purchasers).
91. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *21-24 (describing
advowsons).
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C. Environmental consequences of modernist rights: legal pluralism, legal
triumph
What happens to the environment, then, when modernist rights enter the
scene? The answer depends to some degree on the relationship of the new property
regime to any informal or customary regimes that precede it. In this Section, I first
briefly take up the scenario in which a modernist regime emerges but fails to
displace whatever preexisting informal regimes may have been present-a
situation that Daniel Fitzpatrick somewhat euphemistically dubs "legal pluralism,"
and one that threatens potentially disastrous social and environmental conflicts. 92 I
then turn at greater length to the even more interesting scenario in which a
modernist regime does trump all others-reducing social conflict but still entailing
environmental consequences, notably the tendency toward regional monoculture.
Economists have pointed out that property regimes are far from costless.
93
Like roads, property regimes are public goods, and like all public goods, their
establishment depends on politics. Indeed, however prosaic the modernist record
systems and enforcement mechanisms may appear, a modernist property regime is
an even more substantial achievement than a road network. Unlike roads, formal
property rights may face formidable competition from informal systems. A
network of old mews can scarcely put a new highway out of business. But the
inertia of customary property practices, the resistance of traditionalist leaders, the
self-interest of short-term entrepreneurs, and the influence of ideological or corrupt
power-brokers, may all seriously undermine efforts to establish and maintain
modernist property rights.94 This is particularly the case where governmental
property policies themselves are fractured and weakened by conflicting legal
principals and competition among different agencies. 95 At least some of these
diverging interests may strive to maintain complex informal regimes or extralegal
access to resources, in opposition to modernist property rights. Thus, as Fitzpatrick
has recently argued, a partially-successful modernist regime may only degrade
prior methods for ordering access to resources without establishing a clear
alternative, opening the door for a tragedy of the commons of conflicting claims.
96
Where resources become more accessible and hence more valuable for
distant markets (as, for example, with new roads), overlapping and conflicting
conceptions of entitlement can be a ticket to social conflict and economic loss. The
work of Alston, Libecap, and Mueller on the Brazilian Amazon region
convincingly illustrates the devastating consequences that follow where a race to
92. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1022-23, 1037-38, 1040-45
(2006) (describing how incomplete introduction of formal rights may lead to conflict,
overuse of resources).
93. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A
Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 163-68 (1975) (analyzing property rights
systems as developing through comparison of costs and benefits); Libecap, supra note 12, at
380 (noting economic and political costs of property rights regimes).
94. Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 1037-42.
95. See ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 16-22 (describing legal and institutional
conflicts in property regimes in Brazilian Amazon region).
96. Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 1037-42.
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develop resources occurs in the context of conflicting conceptions of property
rights, consequences that include violence between new settlers and older landed
interests.97 Similar conflicts have appeared in other parts of the world. For
example, in Indonesia, holders of modernist resource extraction concessions find
that they face local resistance along with demands for protection payoffs from the
military. 98
Serious environmental degradation is a very likely consequence of this
scenario. When new arrivals and even old-timers cannot be sure of their long-term
holdings, they are likely to abandon investment and instead take what they can
while they can. Thus, in the worst-case scenario both socially and environmentally,
the introduction of modernist property regimes degrades prior regimes while only
partially supplanting them, leading to Fitzpatrick's "legal pluralism" of competing
claims to entitlement.
99
What are the environmental consequences where modernist regimes take
hold more fully? Does the successful supplanting of an informal, community-
based rights structure substitute an environmentally indifferent regime for an
environmentally friendly regime? The answer, of course, depends greatly on the
prior informal regime itself. As pointed out above, a weakening traditionalist rights
structure may only add to confusion and uncertainty about rights, and in that
respect encourage social conflict and an accompanying loss of environmental
resources. But it bears noting that even an intact and functioning traditionalist
rights system may not have been particularly protective of environmental
resources. Contrary to romantic notions of village or tribal life, some informal
rights structures can apparently be quite damaging to the environment over time.
Prehistoric people's hunting practices did not prevent anthropogenic extinctions. 100
In modem times, some indigenous communities appear to be indifferent to the
environmental effects of their resource practices, perhaps because they do not
perceive environmental resources to be scarce, or perhaps because they regard
concern as disrespectful doubt of God's bounty.101
Where informal or customary norms only arise for the sake of short-term
resource exploitation, they may be even more damaging environmentally. If the
patterns of nineteenth century whaling norms are an example, customary practices
may have even contributed to extinctions; the whalers' customs focused on short-
term efficient hunting practices at the long-term cost of whale stocks. 10 2 Similarly,
informal entitlements among California gold miners helped them work their claims
in relative peace among themselves, even as their activities trashed the landscape
97. ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 153-54.
98. Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 1043-44.
99. Id. at 1039.
100. See PAUL EHRLICH & ANN EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 111 (1981) (noting finds of woolly
mammoth bones together with anthropogenic hunting implements).
101. See Carrier, supra note 68, at 150-56 (describing Papua New Guinea's
Ponam islanders' view that divine rather than human agency affects fish populations).
102. ELLICKSON, supra note 69, at 206.
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beyond recognition.' 0 3 These episodes are consistent with a larger pattern that
anthropologist Bonnie McCay has noticed in informal property regimes: they tend
to focus on managing conflict within the group and protecting the in-group from
other out-groups, rather than on conserving the resource they use. °4
On the other hand, informal rights structures often have some
conservationist features, wittingly or unwittingly, especially those that involve
long-lasting contact with a particular resource base. Clearly some communities are
aware of potential damage to their major resource bases, and they make conscious
efforts to conserve. 0 5 Even when that is not the case, community-based regimes
are frequently limited to particular groups, and because they are associated with
economies that are for the most part relatively local, they tend also to operate at
fairly low levels technologically.' 0 6 The residents of an isolated fishing village
may be completely uninterested in conservation, but their fishing customs are
unlikely to have the impact on shell fisheries that a modern bottom-scraping
trawler does. The fishing village keeps most of its own fish, which limits the take
to something like subsistence levels, whereas the trawler's operators anticipate
sales anywhere in the world, and they take what they can accordingly. Moreover,
the fishing village is not likely to be wealthy; the relatively low technology levels
of traditional communities limit or at least slow down the environmental impact
that informal rights structures have on the environment-though, once again, over
time that impact may be substantial.
How do modernist right regimes compare? Alston and his collaborators
urge that titling programs-that is to say, modernist, alienable property rights-
can allow landholders to borrow, invest, and generally improve land and move its
use toward higher economic values.'0 7 Clearly, those results are preferable to the
chaotic situation where resource users compete under pluralistic conceptions of
entitlement. Nevertheless, these modernist resource uses are very likely to be
commercial ones because those are the uses most salient to modernist asset
holders. On the whole, owners with secure title will only consider conservationist
uses if and when they are recompensed for conservation °8-somewhat unlikely in
many instances, given the frequent non-market character of environmental goods.
103. Andrea G. McDowell, From Commons to Claims: Property Rights in the
California Gold Rush, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 17-19, 65-66 (2002) (emergence of
mining claims when conflict loomed, rough though incomplete efficiency of rules); id at 62
(impact of mining on soil).
104. Bonnie J. McCay, Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts,
Situations, and Events, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 361, 370-71 (Elinor Ostrom et al.
eds., 2002)
105. See, e.g., NETTING, supra note 87, at 78 (describing Swiss villagers' limits on
grazing in common pasture).
106. See Maragia, supra note 80, at 221-25 (attributing low levels of ecological
damage in pre-colonial societies to low levels of technology); see also Banner, supra note
69, at 814 (noting that pre-contact Maori society had little opportunity for wealth
accumulation).
107. ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 3, 9-13.
108. See Robert Mendelsohn & Michael Balick, Private Property and Rainforest
Conservation, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1322, 1323 (1995) (arguing that private property
owners will follow resource uses with highest return, not necessarily conservationist).
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Thus formal modernist titling, if successful, undoubtedly has salutary effects for
social peace and economic growth, but the environmental consequences are more
mixed; as with roads, the public infrastructure of property rights opens up more
environmental resources to market exploitation, albeit a rational and longer-term
exploitation.
To be sure, modernist rights-holders who depend on renewable resources
can correct problems of overexploitation, and in certain respects they can probably
do so more effectively than many traditionalists can. Modernist property rights
allow fish farms to replace overfishing trawlers, and the fish farm operator is well
aware of the dangers of overfishing, perhaps unlike the traditionalist fishers.
However, even putting to one side the external environmental damage caused by
fish farms, 10 9 the modernist fish farmer is part of a picture of localized
monocultures; he is not a generalist but rather he concentrates on the small number
of attributes of his property that will be most valuable in the very large market he
serves. Farmed shrimp are sold in major cities in the developed world, with the
consequence that shrimp farms have supplanted mangrove swamps on Asian
coastlines. 110 Mangrove swamps do not bring a return to the owner through trade,
while shrimp farming does. Once again, as with roads, modernist property rights
serve a wider commerce, wider commerce promotes specialization, and
specialization promotes local monocultures.
The bottom line is that modernist property rights, like roads, are a kind of
public infrastructure for what is often (and mistakenly) considered a
quintessentially private activity-that is, commerce and trade. Commerce and
trade are possible without publicly supported roads or publicly supported property
rights-but public infrastructure makes these activities much easier, much more
fluid, much cheaper, much more expansive, and hence vastly more productive.
Expanded commerce and trade bring the many parts of world together, and they
vastly enhance total wealth, but they also undermine local diversity, both social
and environmental. The next question, and perhaps the hardest, is whether public
infrastructure of rights can be turned around to protect environmental resources.
Il. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN SERVICE TO THE
ENVIRONMENT-THE ROLE OF MODERNIST RIGHTS
Can modernist rights protect the environment? Certainly many people
hope that they can, and that property rights can supplement or replace more
cumbersome forms of environmental regulation. Because of the difficulty and
expense of defining environmental property rights, however, and because of the
diffuseness of support for environmental issues generally, these kinds of rights
109. See Mary Liz Brenninkmeyer, The Ones that Got Away: Regulating Escaped
Fish and Other Pollutants from Salmon Fish Farms, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 75, 75-76
(1999) (describing pollution from fish farms).
110. See Christopher F. Knud-Hansen, Comment, Shrimp Mariculture:
Environmental Impact and Regulations with a Focus on Thailand, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 183, 183-84, 189-90 (1995) (describing growth of shrimp farming for
international markets in less developed countries, as well as destruction of mangrove
swamps).
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regimes are likely to be a lagging public infrastructure. They are likely to lag first
behind roads and then behind conventional property rights and then even behind
other more conventional forms of regulation."' But the wealth that roads and
modernist rights bring, together with higher values on scarce environmental goods,
make environmental property rights at least thinkable.
Some environmentalist hopes involve the use of one of the most prosaic
instruments of the public infrastructure of property-the recording or registration
system. Other hopes focus on a new form of property right, the tradable rights
created in cap-and-trade programs. I will consider both in order.
A. Private conservation restrictions
Aside from registration or recording, a venerable method to signal one's
claim to land is to mark the land physically, for example by cutting trees, erecting
fences, and/or farming or mining. As the common law nostrum put it, those
activities constitute a declaration of one's intent to take the land for one's self.
112
Property marked through such physical intrusion is modernist in the sense that the
markers are intended to be observable by any stranger at all (rather than only by
insiders to a community) and also modernist in the sense that these kinds of
property claims are presumably available to commercial transactions with
strangers. Thus, when countries like Brazil and Ecuador have granted title to
settlers who would make "productive" uses of what were considered underused
areas in the Amazon region, they not only encouraged clearance but they also
opened up to commerce those now more clearly marked regions--commerce both
for their products and for the land itself.' 13
As economists and conservationists have pointed out, however, a land-grant policy
based on physical intrusion can have devastating environmental consequences."
4
Not only do settlers alter the natural setting, but they are also likely to fragment it
into small pieces. If claims are based on physical alteration, they can only be as
large as the area in which a settler can physically signal his control. Recording and
registration systems obviate the need for these physical markers. Unlike physical
markers, recorded or registered claims occur off-site, through paper or electronic
111. Environmental property rights generally come later than other forms of
environmental regulation because the latter do not raise so directly the issues of distribution
of entitlements. See Libecap, supra note 12, at 397; see also, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness
Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 375-76 (2004) (noting that
in fishing, individual quota systems lag behind other regulations like gear restrictions, and
noting that gear restrictions have been easier to establish because they seemed more
egalitarian).
112. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, at *9, *258.
113. ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 10-11 (noting land speculation, resale by
early settlers to higher-value followers).
114. See Robert Mendelsohn, Property Rights and Tropical Deforestation, 46
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 750, 751, 755 (1994) (noting undue deforestation where property
rights are established through physical "improvement"); Fearnside, supra note 51, at 714-
16 (decrying deforestation that follows tradition of according property rights to squatters
invading "unused" land).
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records. This means that registration or recording can signal ownership that is
dedicated to unintrusive or passive uses-that is to say, preservationist uses.
In the last few decades, environmentalists have come to appreciate this
aspect of recording/registration systems and to generate new property forms that
take advantage of recording and registration. Within the United States, many states
have adopted legislation that allows for the creation of conservation easements and
similar devices that allow owners to restrict land to low-intensity uses in the
future.'1 5 Conservation easements and similar restrictions depend critically on
record systems because otherwise these passive uses have no way to signal their
presence.
On a larger scale, and of more importance to retaining tropical rainforests
whose destruction could add substantially to global warming, non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") have organized not only conservation easements but a
variant in the form of "debt-for-nature" swaps.1 1 6 These involve paying off less-
developed countries' debts in exchange for conservation restrictions in sensitive
areas. These deals too depend on record-keeping to identify the lands in question
and the restrictions to which they are subject, as well as enforcement to prevent
violation. Once in place, however, they have the characteristic advantage of
modernist rights: they are open to everyone. Conservation easements can invite
investment from any person or organization in the world, a feature that can greatly
expand their extent.
%juviuusly, .... and fI.n-tioning
before they can be used for conservationist purposes. That may not always be the
case as new locations move inside what Alston, Libecap and Mueller call the
economic frontier.11 7 Record systems may be particularly inadequate in those
environmentally sensitive areas that have remained undeveloped because until
recently, most people found them too remote or difficult for settlement. Indeed,
malfunctioning or nonexistent record systems might be one factor in some
governments' decision to base remote-area land claims on physical markers.
Another factor, however, could derive from distributional considerations; that is,
an attempt to favor small-scale landownership by limiting claims to areas that
115. See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for
Land Preservation, 3 ENvTL. LAW 319, 335 (1997) (describing state statutes); see also
Stephanie Stem, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of
Financial Incentives, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 541, 567-82 (2006) (offering suggestions for
improved incentives based on behavioral psychology).
116. See Andrew Wolman, Review of Conservation Payment Initiatives in Latin
America: Conservation Concessions, Conservation Incentive Agreements and Permit
Retirement Schemes, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 859, 865-70 (2004)
(describing debt-for-nature and conservation easements); see also Kristin Hite, Back to the
Basics: Improved Property Rights Can Help Save Ecuador's Rainforests, 16 GEO. INT'L
ENVT. L. REV. 763, 789-94 (2004) (describing advantages of conservation easements and
debt-for-nature swaps, as well as possible future carbon markets); Laurance et al., supra
note 48, at 479 (arguing that old growth tropical forests are especially significant for carbon
sequestration).
117. ALSTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 13-14 (defining the "economic frontier" as
that region where those with few other opportunities can at least break even).
HeinOnline -- 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 434 2008
20081 BIG ROADS, BIG RIGHTS 435
individuals can clear and use, whatever the consequences to rainforest destruction
and habitat fragmentation.
Institutional frailty as well as conflicting governmental motives, then, can
confound efforts to establish passive land uses through modernist property rights-
especially in the very remote forested regions most salient to climate change. But
this is not a failing inherent in modernist property rights as such. It is rather a
signal of the costs and practical difficulties of establishing modernist property in
remote areas, particularly for environmental purposes.
B. Tradable environmental allowances
Whatever their practical difficulties, conservation easements represent a
relatively straightforward extension of modernist property rights into the
environmental arena. In connection with global warming, however, much more
attention now focuses on what appears to be a more innovative extension of
modernist property rights: cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse gases. As
mentioned at the outset, a chief model for these programs is the United States'
program for reduction of the acid rain precursor gas, SO 2, and the chief new
instances are the cap-and-trade programs set out in the Kyoto Protocol" 8 and
developed in the European Union, as well as in the voluntary programs of several
U.S. states and Canadian provinces."19
These cap-and-trade institutions are an extension of modernist property
concepts in that they establish formal entitlements and allow their trade to virtually
anyone. How do they fare with respect to the environmentally problematic aspects
of modernist rights? Earlier sections of this Article identified two particularly
important and potentially problematic aspects of these big rights regimes, in two
different scenarios. First, where modernist rights succeed only partially in
displacing preexisting community-based resource management regimes or other
informal practices, they can contribute to Fitzpatrick's "legal pluralism"-
uncertain and overlapping claims regimes, together with insecurity and the
accompanying short-term and environmentally devastating resource
exploitation. 120 Second, where modernist rights do take hold successfully, these
rights-together with the roads and other transportation systems that generally
precede modernist rights-tend to produce localized monocultures in a larger
trading market. 12 ' Do those features of modernist rights affect cap-and-trade for
greenhouse gases?
As to the first, legal pluralism and the potential disruption of preexisting
community management or other informal regimes, greenhouse gas cap-and-trade
programs would at first glance seem to present no particular problem. Prior to the
programs themselves, there is no demand at all for these kinds of rights.
118. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7 Add. 2, reprinted in 37 I.L.P. 22 (1998).
119. For a brief description, see Nadia Zakir, Emissions Trading Initiatives:
Responding to Climate Change Through Market Forces, 16 Bus. L. TODAY 19 (July/Aug.
2007) (describing programs).
120. See supra Part II.C.
121. See supra Part II.C.
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Greenhouse gases are not noticeable and not easy to monitor without technical
equipment, and in addition their ill effects are extremely diffuse. Those
characteristics make them an unlikely candidate for preexisting community-based
management regimes, with their usually limited levels of technology and their
concentration on local resources.12 2 It is certainly possible that newly minted cap-
and-trade regimes could conflict with several recent smaller-scale and voluntary
programs of the same sort, 12 3 but with that exception, modernist controls on
greenhouse gas emissions have no rival regimes to disrupt.
24
On the other hand, when one comes to the more indirect question of
offsets for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, a cap-and-trade system
might indeed entail disruptions to a community regime or other informal practices.
This would particularly be the case if the trading system contemplates offsets for
forestry management in order to create so called "carbon sinks"--extensive
vegetation sites that sequester carbon dioxide terrestrially. The recent experience
of pharmaceutical researchers with bioprospecting is instructive. The idea was to
compensate communities for their role in conserving and identifying plants and
animals with potential value for pharmaceutical products. But payments for
community-based resource management have sometimes raised a multitude of
conflicting claims and ill-will, suggesting that any such payment schemes need to
be thought out carefully as to who gets what, and for what.
125
Moreover, the most meaningful old-growth forest reserves for greenhouse
gas offsets, and those that have the greatest potential for reducing global warming,
122. Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental
Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental
Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra notel04, at 233, 245-47 (noting that
community-based management regimes generally have not focused on pollution,
particularly outside the community).
123. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This
Say about Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1015-20 (2006) (brief
overview of state and local initiatives). In addition to Professor Engel, my thanks to
Professor William Funk of Lewis & Clark Law School for this reminder about the
preemption issue.
124. Cap-and-trade programs involving resource extraction, like fishing or
grazing, could be very different; there are many community-based regimes about resource
extraction. Id. One could imagine that the introduction of an individual cap-and-trade
allowance system would be disruptive and produce much conflict if it were to be
introduced, say, in the Monhegan Island lobster fishery. See Katrina M. Wyman, The
Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 528 (2008) (noting
that individual fishing quota regimes have put many fishers out of work in fishing
communities).
125. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 119-25 (2003)
(describing chaotic results when researchers sought to compensate communities for
biological knowledge and conservation); see also CoRI HAYDEN, WHEN NATURE GOES
PUBLIC: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF BIOPROSPECTING IN MEXICO 100-08 (2003)
(same).
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are likely to be in remote areas of the tropics. 126 But reserves in these locations
present particular problems. Not only may forest reserves compete with such
indigenous agricultural practices as slash and burn, but even more importantly,
they compete with later-arriving informal practices of logging, poaching, and
similar depredations of forest resources, often compounded by corruption of the
relevant officials. All these informal local practices can render formal reserves
simply one more type of claim in a chaotic scenario of conflicting entitlement
regimes. 127
Monitoring and enforcement are thus critical if forestry is to count among
CO 2 offsets. Perhaps just as critical is persuasion. As Gary Libecap continually
stresses, those doing well under previous systems of entitlement often must be
placated before new kinds of property regimes can take hold.' 28 On this issue, there
may be some lessons from the successes of wildlife park management in Africa,
where communities have taken over wildlife management and as a result have
curtailed poaching by themselves and others. 129 That is to say, insofar as they have
succeeded, these wildlife management regimes have recruited a more sympathetic
informal group in order to control the much less sympathetic informal group of
lawbreaking poachers.
The second major problem area, the scenario in which modernist rights
take hold but also encourage localized monocultures, presents somewhat different
issues, and indeed reveals some of the most interesting features of cap-and-trade
programs. The argument earlier was that, like roads, modernist property rights
encourage trade, and trade encourages localized specialization-hence localized
monocultures in resource development. Tradeable environmental rights have
already been shown to have some of the same characteristics.
The well-known hotspot problem is an example: trade in pollution
entitlements effectively allows specialization, which can translate into local
concentrations as particular areas unwillingly "specialize" in receiving
126. Ken Caldeira, When Being Green Raises the Heat, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,
2007, at A21 (discussing view that that northern forests may reduce carbon but also raise
heat by absorbing sun's rays, while tropical forests generate heat-lowering cloud cover).
127. Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 1039-40 (describing "legal and normative
pluralism" resulting from incomplete replacement of former informal regimes by formalist
property system).
128. Libecap, supra note 12, at 385; see also GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS 5-6 (1989).
129. The leading example is Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management
Programme for Indigenous Resources ("CAMPFIRE"), described in Donald T. Hornstein,
Environmental Sustainability and Environmental Justice at the International Level: Traces
of Tension and Traces of Synergy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 291, 299-301 (1999). A
more skeptical view of community wildlife management is presented by Alexander N.
Songorwa, Ton Bhrs & Ken F. D. Hughey, Community-Based Wildlife Management in
Africa: A Critical Assessment of the Literature, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603, 613-40 (2000)
(assessing the sometimes incorrect assumptions of community wildlife management).
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pollutants.' 30 On the other hand, trading in greenhouse gas emissions should be
immune from the hotspot problem. Even if Producer A purchases vast quantities of
carbon emission rights from Producer B, the carbon emissions will all float upward
into the same atmospheric layer, without respect to whether they come from A, B,
or A and B together.'
31
Here again, however, there is a different story when it comes to offsets,
particularly if offsets or credits are allowed for carbon sinks-that is to say,
forestation and forestry management in particular localities. Insofar as modernist
rights encourage this kind of local specialization, they could of course represent an
environmental upside rather than a downside-and especially if the maintenance
of old-growth forest cover counts as a credit, since old-growth forests can act as a
kind of positive hotspot for biodiversity. 132 The Amazon forest researcher Phillip
Fearnside has argued for the maintenance of tropical rainforests in the effort to
reduce climate change, particularly to reduce the enormous release of carbon that
comes from their burning and transformation to other land uses, and he is a strong
proponent of granting carbon credits for those existing forests. 33
Here, however, one characteristic of modernist property rights-the need
for alienability-runs into another: the need for simplicity in alienable
entitlements. Unfortunately, forestry credits are riddled with complexity. The
Kyoto accords give a preview: while some forestry efforts can count as carbon
credits, those credits generally go to new trees, i.e. forestation or reforestationprJ ;ojets 134 Why does e;;ng oFet growth not count? Fearside thinks that 
major reason is the European fear that the United States will continue its gas-
guzzling ways by buying up forestry credits instead of cutting emissions.
135
Perhaps there is something of that same kind of moral censoriousness in the Kyoto
insistence that forestry and other so-called clean development credits meet the
criterion of "additionality"-that they be some measure in addition to what was
going to happen anyway. 136 Old-growth forests, no matter how much they absorb
carbon, flunk additionality.
But the current Kyoto participants are not the only ones to be wary of
forestry credits. Writing under the auspices of the Property and Environment
Research Center ("PERC"), a free-market environmental organization that is
normally very optimistic about property rights, Brandon Scarborough argues that
we should give up on forestry credits in the effort to cut greenhouse gases,
130. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607, 628-29 (2000) (describing hotspot problem and
environmental justice concerns).
131. Id. at 627.
132. Id. at 657, n. 140 (using the phrase "biodiversity hotspot').
133. Philip M. Feamside, Saving Tropical Forests as a Global Warming
Countermeasure: An Issue That Divides the Environmental Movement, 39 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 167, 171 (2001) (describing greenhouse gas release from deforestation).
134. Dennis D. Hirsch, Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the
Clean Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 623, 629-30 (2007).
135. Fearnside, supra note 133, at 171, 177.
136. Hirsch, supra note 134, at 630.
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principally because it is too hard to define the entitlements.' 37 Among other things,
trees of different types and in different locations vary tremendously in their
contributions to climate change control efforts, Scarborough says, and in the end it
is just not worth the effort. 38 On this view, forestry credits cannot be made simple,
and if they cannot be made simple, they cannot become the subjects of modernist,
tradable property rights.
Notice that the destruction of tropical rainforests is by no means
irrelevant to global climate change. Quite the contrary, forest conflagrations are a
major contributor to atmospheric carbon dioxide. 139 Moreover, forest conservation,
particularly in the tropics, serves the double function of biodiversity protection,
while payments for tropical forest conservation could offer much-needed
assistance to the conservation efforts of some impoverished less-developed
nations. But forest conservation clearly poses a challenge to a modernist property
rights structure like cap-and-trade. As with many resources that are difficult to
measure and monitor, credits for forestry conservation are very likely to entail
accepting rough proxies (e.g., acres of trees) that only imperfectly capture the
attribute of greatest concern-that is, greenhouse gas sequestration-and that only
imperfectly compare it with alternative reduction methods.14
0
Another factor needs to be borne in mind about the use of modernist
rights for environmental ends. Ultimately, both conservation easements and cap-
and-trade regimes engage modernist property rights in an enterprise very different
from the traditional tasks served by public infrastructure for roads and rights.
Conservation areas are very likely to be literally roadless, just as their products are
largely immune from the inroads of buying and selling. Indeed, the same
commerce-blocking phenomenon occurs in cap-and-trade programs themselves.
The "trade" aspect of cap-and-trade is very much within the modernist property
frame-fungible entitlements, traded to anyone at all in open commercial markets.
But the "cap" aspect is not at all a part of modernist property conventions. The cap
is akin to a roadless area: it is a portion of the resource in question that is not to be
bought and sold, but rather held as a kind of reserve.
This closure to commerce is quite foreign to the usual object of rights and
roads. To be sure, closure to commerce may not be so problematic for
conservation reserves or trusts, especially smaller ones. After all, property owners
have long exercised their private tastes for passive resource uses by saving parks
and gardens. But larger conservation reserves will entail many more issues of
monitoring and policing, as well as basic definitions of the ends to be served.
137. Brandon Scarborough, Trading Forest Carbon: A Panacea or Pipe Dream to
Address Climate Change?, PERC POLICY SERIES PS-40, 7-10, 20 (July 2007), available at
http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps40.pdf.
138. Id. at 4, 20.
139. See, e.g., Laurance et al., supra note 48, at 479-80 (describing impact of
forest fires on global warming).
140. See Carol M. Rose, From H20 to C0 2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon
Trading, 50 ARIz. L. REv. 91, 108-09 (2008) (describing difficult choices when treating
hard-to-measure resources as property); see also Hirsch, supra note 134, at 637-38 (noting
difficulties).
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As to cap-and-trade, unused air is a very large resource, and capping its
use entails treating the capped portion as something like public property-a very,
very large public property. There are indeed other large public properties, such as
the public lands in the United States, but their history is not entirely auspicious.
Though the public may "own" the public lands, the public does not speak very
clearly about its interests as a general matter, and in the meantime, there are large
numbers of special interests who have detailed reasons why their own uses should
not be excluded after all. Although there has been much written on the "public
trust" in recent decades, the concept of a public trust has no well-developed
theoretical implications for most public property---except, ironically, the use of
public property for those venerable levers of commerce, waterways, and roads.' 4'
It is a straw in the wind that cap-and-trade programs have all adopted caps based
either on the status quo (as in "no net loss" of wetlands) or on some rollback from
current levels (as in the Acid Rain legislation or the initial round under the Kyoto
accords for CO2 reduction). There is no compelling theory that drives a more
coherent version of the public trust in a capped resource.
Environmental property rights regimes, then, entail a departure from the
standard goals not only of roadbuilding but also of modernist property regimes.
Their closure to commerce leaves a conceptual gap as to what is to be done with
the blocked-off aspects, as well as a threat emanating from the usual villains of
public choice stories. This may be one reason why environmentalist concerns have
often turned to regimes involving what I have called "fuzzy rights."'
' 42
C. Fuzzy Property Rights
Fuzzy property rights are the creatures of regimes like environmental
impact review and negotiated regulations; that is, legal regimes that bring many
interests to the table, that recognize some kind of incomplete consultative rights in
all the stakeholders and that indeed require a considerable amount of consultation
and double-checking. All this negotiation tends to damp down the rapid pace of
commerce rather than speed it up, and it also turns to what are effectively political
solutions for property uses.
In one sense, fuzzy property in environmental law is itself a modernist
phenomenon because its consultative practices derive not from long customs but
rather from the public infrastructure of legislation, regulation, and judicial
enforcement. But in another sense, fuzzy property rights are not modernist at all, or
if they are, they constitute a modernist formalization of the practices common in
141. Like other theories of public property, the public trust theory is most
coherent for roads, waterways, and communication channels. See Rose, supra note 24, at
774 (noting that traditional doctrines of inherently public property revolved around
transportation, communication, and commerce); see also Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the
Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 359-60 (1998) (same).
142. Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991,
1003-07 (2005) (book review) (describing one kind of property as "fuzzy rights").
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informal property regimes, where entitlements are not well-defined but are rather
settled in the give-and-take of roundabout negotiations and tacit understandings. 1
43
It should be observed that environmental law is not the only area where
one sees the infrastructure of modernist property shaping fuzzy property regimes.
Intellectual property, for example, is itself a modernist invention, a creature of a
public infrastructure of property rights, but it includes a number of somewhat hazy
exceptions for other users, as for example "fair use" in copyright. The
anthropologist Michael Brown, concerned about the impact of modernist
intellectual property on respect for indigenous groups and their practices, has
called for even fuzzier property in the usual domains of copyright, trademark, and
patent, so that cultural entitlements can be settled not just through the rapid
processes of commerce, but also through the more leisurely processes of
consultation and negotiation. 1
44
Fuzzy property, like other complex rights regimes, 45 is most likely to be
deployed under circumstances where resource uses overlap in complicated ways
and where precise allocation of individual entitlements would raise exorbitant
definitional costs. Under those circumstances more consultative regimes may
actually be a less costly form of resource management. Small wonder, then, that as
more persons claim an interest in the United States' public lands, our public lands
policy has come to include a large dose of fuzzy rights in the form of
environmental assessments and consultative planning. With respect to global
warming, one might expect the most serious applications of fuzzy property in
connection with, once again, forestry reserves, where there are multiple claimants
and where exact inputs and outputs of gases are most difficult to assess.
But in a certain sense, the cap on greenhouse gases is itself a meta-fuzzy
property. Insofar as the greenhouse gas cap approximates a public property, it is to
be expected that this cap too-and particularly its consistency and its allowable
offsets and credits-will be subject to many of the fuzzy characteristics of
deliberation and delay, through a kind of worldwide political process. Indeed, it
has been assumed from the outset of climate change negotiations that multiple
participants would be involved, including not only governments but also NGOs,
and the deliberative process has already begun, as the world's numerous claimants
jockey for position on the cap's size and makeup.
There are two chief concerns here. The first is that more traditional fuzzy
property regimes have normally worked best in smaller-scale customary groups
whose members lead intertwined lives and who can influence one another by
143. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 69, at 67-81 (describing informal give-
and-take with respect to property issues in close-knit community).
144. Brown, supra note 125, at 143-72, 233-34, 247 (extolling negotiated
solutions); see also Rose, supra note 142, at 1005-06 (describing Brown's position as a
move toward fuzzy rights).
145. Cf Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 480-81 (2002) (describing complex
property rules to deal with complicated interactions in medieval common fields (citing
Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000))).
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mutual informal sanctions and reputation. 146 The modernist extension of fuzzy
consultative rights to very large numbers, with highly heterogeneous interests and
few mutual reputational anxieties, raises the specter of the "anti-commons," the
situation in which so many claimants can veto one another that the resource winds
up in stasis. 147 The second and related concern is that with respect to controlling
greenhouse gases, any such stasis could delay action to a point where action is
futile. Both are serious concerns, not entirely overcome by the conceit that
organized governments and NGOs will consolidate the concerns of their citizens
and act as their spokespersons.
Over the longer run, however-if we can get to a longer run-there could
be some benefits from deliberative processes for controlling greenhouse gases. We
learn from ecological studies that complexity in an ecosystem may slow rapid
adaptation, but complexity also enhances the resilience of an ecosystem as a
whole. 148 Complexity in human affairs, and in public property management in
particular, may have some of the same tendencies-resisting rapid adaptation but
also enhancing resilience over a longer run. But once again, the most pressing




Modern roads and rights both represent versions of public infrastructure.
Roads and rights have many of the same kinds of impacts on surrounding
ecosystems, particularly in reducing local diversity, and indeed, roads and rights
reinforce each other in causing those impacts. But at the same time, in serving
commerce, roads and rights help to create the social wealth and taste that can be
turned to environmental purposes.
One paradox of modern environmentalism is that the very public
infrastructure that created a felt need for environmental protection in the first place
is now being called upon to satisfy that need, particularly in the form of new
property regimes. Nevertheless, we scarcely have any choice except to meet this
call by a robust public infrastructure of newly modeled rights. Modernist property
devices, ranging from recording systems to tradeable environmental allowances to
fuzzy property, may all be adapted to protect environmental resources. But these
146. ELLICKSON, supra note 69, at 177-78, 181-82 (predicting development of
efficient social practices in "close-knit groups," whose members know about one anothers'
actions and can sanction them; small size is normal though not essential); see also OSTROM,
supra note 65, at 75-76 (noting that in ancient and still-extant irrigation systems in eastern
Spain, low fines are generally levied for overuse infractions, since farmers are sufficiently
controlled by embarrassment).
147. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 667 (1998) (describing
"anticommons").
148. David Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: Lessons From the
Study of Complex Adaptive Systems, MrNN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (applying
ecological theory to federalism).
149. See Libecap, supra note 12, at 386-87 (describing greater difficulties of
international negotiations for alterations in property regimes).
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adaptations reflect the underlying paradox, in that they dramatically alter the
commercial goals that roads and rights have so long served. Environmental issues
test modernist property rights' capacity to make these adaptations-and no test
will be more critical than that of dealing with climate change.
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